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RECENT CASES
TORTS-WIFE or NEGLIGENTLY INJURED MAN HAS CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR Loss OF CONSORTrum
Cyril H. Millington became completely paralyzed from the waist down as
a result of an elevator accident. Plaintiff, Mr. Millington's wife, brought an
action for loss of consortium, alleging that this radical change in her married
life was due to defendants' negligence, breach of warranty and statutory viola-
tions. Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of legal
insufficiency was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Appellate
Division.' The New York Court of Appeals, in 4-3 decision, reversed; held, the
wife of a negligently injured man has a cause of action for loss of consortium.
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 293 N.Y.S2d 305, 239
N.E.2d 897 (1968).
Consortium is the "conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right
of each to the company, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every
conjugal relation."2 The term includes the exclusive right to the services of the
spouse and to his or her society, companionship, and conjugal affection.8
Historically, the doctrine of consortium was first promulgated in a period when
the wife was completely subordinate to her husband; "(her) existence, socially
and economically, pivoted around that of a dominant husband, authoritarian
and paternalistic." 4 Husband and wife were one, and "he was that one."5'
Upon marriage all the wife's real property, money and chattels became
those of her husband. Her rights were extremely limited, and she lacked both
the capacity to contract and the capacity to sue.6 The husband was entitled to
the wife's services in the home as he would be to those of any servant in his em-
ploy; and should he lose them through the acts of another, that other was
required to respond in damages. His right of action for injury to her was
grounded on the theory that she was his servant.7 But should the husband be
injured, the wife, being a legal nonentity, could bring no action,8 since it was
not disputed that a servant was prohibited from suing for the loss of services
of the master.9 "This then, is the soil in which the doctrine took root; the
abject subservience of wife to husband, her legal nonexistence, her degraded
position as a combination vessel [Sic?], chattel, and household drudge whose
obedience might be enforced by personal chastisement."'1
In the centuries that followed, the social, economic and legal status of the
married woman underwent a drastic evolutionary process. Notwithstanding
1. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 28 A.D.2d 1095, 283 N.Y.S. 854 (1967).
2. Black's Law Dictionary 382 (4th ed. 1951).
3. Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
4. Sovereign v. Sovereign, 354 Mich. 65, 74, 92 N.W.2d 585, 590 (1958).
5. Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956).
6. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 70 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
7. Id.
8. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 442.
9. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 142, 143.
10. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 36, 101 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1960).
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these sweeping changes, the courts continued to adhere to the common-law
rules which allowed the husband a right of action for loss of consortium due to
the negligent injury of his wife but denied the wife a reciprocal action. 1
This is not to say that the courts were completely unaffected by the
married woman's new position in society. Dissolution of the common-law con-
cept of the unity of husband and wife,12 as well as the Married Women's Acts,
induced the majority of courts to grant the wife the same rights as the husband
for intentional interference with the marital relation.13 But the courts con-
tinued to deny the wife recovery for loss of consortium due to negligently in-
flicted injury sustained by her husband.
This practice persisted almost without exception14 until the landmark
Hitaffer15 decision by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia, in 1950. In that case Lucia Hitaffer brought an action against the
Argonne Company, Inc., employer of her husband, to recover for loss of con-
sortium because of negligent injuries sustained by him. The trial court entered
a judgment for the defendant, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that a wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium due to a negli-
gent injury to her husband.
Since Hitaffer, there has been 2 definite split in the courts as to the wife's
cause of action in negligence cases, with the majority of courts still denying
the wife this action. 16 The minority opinion, however, is supported by almost
all legal commentators 17 and has been steadily gaining in strength.
11. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
12. Williams, The Legal Unity of Hutsband and Wife, 10 Modern L. Rev. 16 (1947).
13. Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 A. 1027 (1889); Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581,
29 N.E. 389 (1891); Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N.E. 890 (1906); Clark v. Hill,
69 Mo. App. 541 (1897); Seaver v. Adams, 66 N.H. 142, 19 A. 776 (1890); Bennett v.
Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889); Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. 233, 39 A. 884
(1898) ; Gray v. Gee, 39 T.L.R. 429 (K.B. 1923).
14. It appears that there were two cases in which the wife was granted the right to sue
for loss of consortium due to negligence, but both were subsequently overruled. Hipp v. E. I.
Dupont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318, 18 A.L.R. 873 (1921); overruled by
Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Griffen v. Cincinnati
Realty Co., 27 Ohio 585 (1913); overruled by Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101,
112 N.E. 204 (1915).
15. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
16. Those jurisdictions permitting recovery are: Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wisconsin. In New York, prior to
the instant case, the courts have been in agreement with the majority in denying the wife
a right of action for loss of consortium in negligence cases; but under authority of Kronen-
bitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354, 151 N.E.2d 898, (1958), they
went one step further and also denied this action to the husband. This view is sustained by
a very small minority of courts. The instant case purports to overrule Kronenbitter com-
pletely.
17. See 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts 643 (1956); V. Prosser, The Law of Torts 917
(3d ed. 1964); Green, Relational Interests, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 460 (1934); Holbrook, The Change
in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1923); Kinnaird, Right of Wife to Site
for Loss of Consortium Due to Negligent Injury to Her Husband, 35 Ky. L.J. 220 (1946);
Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 651 (1930); Simeone, The
Wife's Action for Loss of Consorthim-Progress or No?, 4 St. Louis U.L. Rev. 424 (1957);
Notes: 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1341 (1961); 39 Cornell L.Q. 761 (1954); 5 Cornell L.Q. 171
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One of the main arguments advanced by the majority for denying the wife
this right is that the wife's injuries are too remote and indirect to warrant pro-
tection.' 8 "Any harm she sustains occurs only indirectly as a consequence of
the defendant's wrong to the husband."31 9 But the minority is quick to point
out that when the husband has sued for the same loss, his injuries have never
been regarded as too remote or indirect. 20 Furthermore, the wife has been
accorded the right to sue for loss of consortium for intentional wrongs where
the loss is no more direct. In both cases the wife has sustained separate injury
and damage.
21
The majority distinguishes intentional cases by focusing on the fact that
the husband is frequently in pari delicto, or at least without motive to seek
redress, with the result that the wrong may well go uncorrected if an action by
the husband is a prerequisite. 22 The minority contends that the same basic
reasoning for allowing the wife to sue in intentional cases-the protection of
the family unit-will support an extension of this rule to negligence cases.
2 3
Perhaps the most important objection set forth by the majority to allow-
ing recovery is the claim that no cause of action for loss of consortium of the
husband existed for the wife at common law.24 This claim is based on the
premises that: (1) the main element of consortium is support; (2) the wife has
(1920); 20 Fordham L. Rev. 342 (1951); 41 Geo. L.J. 443 (1953); 9 Ind. LJ. 182 (1933);
50 Ky. L.J. 263 (1962); 20 La. L. Rev. 731 (1960); 55 Mich. L. Rev. 721 (1957); 29 N.C.L.
Rev. 178 (1951); 31 Temp. L.Q. 284 (1958); 25 Tul. L. Rev. 293 (1951); 1 U.C.L.A.L. Rev.
223 (1954); 13 U. Miami L. Rev. 92 (1958); 14 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 324 (1957).
18. Deshotel v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958);
Giggey v. Gallagher Trans. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937); Brown v. Kistleman,
177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Amerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918);
Feneff v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R. Co., 203 Mass. 279, 89 N.E. 436 (1909);
Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Rush v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 213 Tenn. 506, 376 S.W.2d 454 (1964).
19. Deshotel v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 666, 328 P.2d, 451 (1958).
20. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir 1950); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d
406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956);
Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
21. Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (DF. Mont. 1961); Novak v.
Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963).
22. Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933); Brown v. Kistleman,
177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918);
Eschenbach v. Benjamine, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276
Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462, 13 A.L.R. 1320 (1919); Gambino v. Mfgrs'. Coal & Coke Co., 175
Mo. App. 653, 158 S.W. 77 (1913); Stout v. Kan. City Term. Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App. 113,
157 S.W. 1019 (1913); Nash v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928);
Snodgrass v. Cherry Burrell Corp., 103 N.H. 56, 164 A.2d 579 (1960); Kosciolek v. Portland
Ry., Light & Power Co., 81 Or. 517, 160 P. 132 (1916).
23. Missouri Pac. Trans. Co. v. Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d
480 (1956); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Novak v. Kan.
City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963).
24. Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960); Deshotel
v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958) ; Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d
420 (Fla. Sup. Ct . 1962) ; Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211 A.2d 891 (1965) ; Snodgrass
v. Cherry Burrell Corp., 103 N.H. 56, 164 A.2d 579 (1960); Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126
S.E.2d 570 (1962); Krohn v. Richardson-MerrelI, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966);
Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W.V. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1962).
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no right as such to her husband's services; and (3) the common law does not
allow recovery for sentimental interests 2 5 Most courts take the view that the
Married Women's Acts removed the common-law disabilities, but did not confer
a new cause of action for loss of consortium.2 6 A small minority of these
courts27 have gone further with this proposition and have construed these
statutes as also abolishing the husband's action as a "fossil from an earlier
era."28
The opposing, minority view is that the husband and wife have equal
rights in the marriage relation; and, prior to the Married Women's Acts, the
wife had to sue through the husband. But, with the passage of these Acts,
this disability was removed; and the wife is now in the same position as the
husband and may similarly invoke the law's protection.
29
The minority also asserts that the element of support is but one of those
embraced within the meaning of consortium. Added to support is "love, affec-
tion, companionship, sexual relations, etc., all welded into a conceptualistic
unity;" and, therefore, the wife need not rely on loss of material services as
the basis for her action, but may demonstrate injury to the consortium as
grounds for her suit.30 In recent years the law has moved towards protecting
emotional interests, 31 and there is no valid reason why this shift in attitude
cannot also be applied to the sentimental elements of consortium. It is further
25. Patelski v. Snyder, 179 Ill. App. 24; Cravens v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 195 Ky.
257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Nash v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928);
Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918); Stout v. Kan. City Term. R. Co., 172
Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1913) ; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio. St. 101, 112 N.E.
304 (1915); Howard v. Verdigris Valley Elec. Co-op., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d 784 (1949);
Sheard v. Oregon Elec. R. Co., 137 Or. 341, 2 P.2d 916 (1931).
26. McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (1949); Brown v. Kistleman,
177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918);
Nash v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276
Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918); Tobiassen v. Polley, 96 NJ.L. 66, 114 A. 153 (1921);
Landwehr v. Barbas, 241 App. Div. 769, 270 N.Y.S. 534 (2nd Dept., 1934); Maloy v.
Foster, 169 Misc. 964, 8 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1938) ; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101,
112 N.E. 204 (1915); Howard v. Verdigris Valley Elec. Co-op, 201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d
784 (1949); Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., Light and Power Co., 81 Or. 517, 160 P. 132 (1916).
27. Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. Supp. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956);
Marri v. Stamford St. R. Co., 84 Conn. Supp. 9, 78 A. 582 (1911); Bolger v. Boston Elevated
R.R. Co., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389 (1910); Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich.
304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 176 N.Y.S.2d
354, 151 N.E.2d 898 (1958); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611
(1945); Newberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960); Martin v. United Elec.
Ry. Co., 71 R.I. 137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945).
28. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: the Impact of Insurance, 18 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 219, 229 (1953).
29. Owens v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Dodge v. Rush, 28 App. D.C. 149, 8 Ann. Cas,
671 (1906); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 ll. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Brandt v. Keller,
413 Ill. 503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1953); Novak v. Kan. City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963); Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917).
30. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
31. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Battalla v. State of N.Y.,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249
(1958); Halo v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dept, 1961).
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contended that denying the wife this right is a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3 2
The possibility of double recovery is often advanced by the majority as a
reason for denying the right of action to the wife.3 3 Since a judgment obtained
by a husband for his negligent injury often includes compensation for his in-
ability to fulfill his normal role in the marriage relation, including that of
support, there is danger of double recovery if a wife is allowed redress for loss
of consortium in a separate action.34 The minority sees this objection as no
great problem. One offered solution requires the wife's action to be brought
in conjunction with her husband's, and provides for the awarding of a con-
solidated judgment.3 5 An alternative answer is to simply deduct from the wife's
recovery any compensation given her husband for impairment of his ability to
support his family.36
Finally, the majority maintains that any change should be instituted by
the legislature rather than by the courts.3 7 "If the legislature found this type of
suit desirable, it could define the extent of the liability, designate who may
maintain the action, and provide safeguards against the danger of double re-
covery . . . .Clarification by statute as to both the husband and wife would,
of course, be preferable to piecemeal determination of the problems by judicial
decision."38 But, the minority is of the opinion that because an action for loss
of consortium is grounded in common, rather than statutory, law, and since it
is an essential function of the courts to constantly re-evaluate common-law
concepts in the light of present day circumstances;3 9 "[i]t is as much the duty
of . .. court[s] to restore a right which has been erroneously withheld by
judicial opinion as it is to recognize it properly in the first instance." 40
32. Owens v. Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Clem v. Brown, 32 Ohio 2d 477, 207 N.E.2d
398 (1965).
33. Giggey v. Gallagher Trans. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937); Bernhardt v.
Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918) ; Stout v. Kan. City Term. Ry. Co., 172 Mo. App.
113, 157 S.W. 1019 (1931); Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205
(1955).
34. Deshotel v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958).
35. Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Ekalo v.
Constructive Service Corp. of Am., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Moran v. Quality
Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
36. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.
2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
37. Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960); Deshotel
v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449 (1958); Ripley v. Ewen, 61 So. 2d
420 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952); Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211 A.2d 891 (1965); Howard
v. Verdigris Valley Elec. Co-op., 201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d 784 (1949); Page v. Winter, 240
S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962); Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d
258 (1958); Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966);
Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43
Wash. 2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953).
38. Deshotel v. Atchinson T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 666, 328 P.2d 449, 451 (1958).
39. Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953);
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 III. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich.
33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960).
40. Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24, 32 (1953).
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In the instant case, the reasoning of the court was much the same as that
employed by the minority of courts mentioned in the preceding discussion.
41
The court, speaking through Judge Keating, pointed to the new position of
the married woman in society. "The passage of statutes which have resulted
in the legal emancipation of married women . . . as well as those enactments
which have imposed equal obligations and responsibilities upon women includ-
ing the requirement of supporting a husband ... have revolutionized the legal
status of married women." 42 It then dealt with the question of double recovery,
and advocated a joint trial as the protection needed to minimize this problem.48
The idea that the action is a dated one was rejected, and the court stated
that "new policies now sustain the.., action . ... "44 for the loss of consortium.
"Thus the 'consortium' interest to be protected here does not rest on any
medieval theory but on the real injury done to the marital relationship."4"
The husband and wife have an equal interest in the marriage relationship;
and, consequently, the wife has an equal right to sue for damages as a result
of injury to that relationship.
It was thus recognized that damage to sentimental and emotional interests
are real injuries, not indirect, and worthy of protection. The argument that
sentimental damages are too personal, intangible and conjectural to be
measured by a jury in terms of money was advanced, but the court rejected this
claim as having no merit; "[t]he logic of it would also hold a jury incompetent
to award damages for pain and suffering. '46 The court mentioned the "equal
protection" argument but declined to pass on this issue since it was not neces-
sary to the court's disposition of the case. Finally, the court turned to the
argument that change should come from the legislature. It declared that it is
the duty of the court to "keep the common law . . . abreast of the needs and
requirements of our age,"'47 even if it means overturning unsound precedent.
Three justices dissented, without opinion, and voted to affirm the dismissal
of the wife's action on the authority of, and for the reasons given in, Kronen-
bitter v. Washburn Wire Co.48
When deciding a case, the court does not, or should not, make that decision
in a vacuum. It must be cognizant of past decisions and legislative provisions.
However, these are not the only guidelines to which a court should direct itself.
41. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 239
N.E.2d 897 (1968).
42. Id. at 501, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 306, 239 N.E.2d at 898.
43. Id. at 502, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 307, 239 N.E.2d at 899.
44. Id. at 507, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 311, 239 N.E.2d at 902.
45. Id. at 504, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 309, 239 N.E.2d at 900.
46. Id. at 507, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 312, 239 N.E.2d at 902.
47. Id. at 508, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 313, 239 N.E.2d at 903.
48. 4 N.Y.2d 524, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354, 151 N.E.2d 898 (1958). The court in Kronenbitter
advanced two principle arguments for denying the wife the right to sue for loss of consortium
in negligence cases. First, there is the danger of double recovery; second, the husband's
right to damages for loss of consortium is based on outworn theory, and rather than extend
this right to the wife, that court advocated denying the action to both husband and wife.
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The general movement of legal principles in related areas is a proper concern
of the court. When these factors are in conflict, a balance must be struck giving
each factor relative weight in light of the particular facts and circumstances gov-
erning the individual case. Perhaps changes in basic policy should rightly be
relegated to the legislature,49 but here the basic policy change has been made
by the legislatures through the Married Women's Acts: that husband and wife
are separate, distinct and independent individuals in the law on equal footing.
The instant case is just bringing New York law in line with that declared policy.
Added support for this proposition is found in the recent changes in the
law of interspousal immunity. Prior to the Married Women's Acts, the legal
disabilities of the married woman at common law made it impossible for the
husband and wife to sue each other in tort.50 After the adoption of the Married
Women's Acts, the majority of the courts still persisted in refusing relief, but
the historical grounds for disallowing such actions were replaced with a variety
of public policy arguments.51 However, these policies have been so severely
criticized by the commentators, by dissenting opinions and by the majority
opinions in those cases rejecting the immunity, that some seventeen jurisdictions,
including New York by statute, have rejected all arguments in justification of
the immunity and have construed the Married Women's Acts as authorizing
an action by either spouse for a personal tort committed by the other.
52
New York has been one of the leading jurisdictions in protecting and
seeking redress for negligent injury to emotional interests, which in recent years
years has been the dominant trend in this area of the law.53 The instant case has
projected this line of liberal judicial thinking into an area of tort law which is
similar in that emotional and sentimental interests are sought to be protected.
49. This is an open question involving the role of the courts in today's legal structure.
However, this is beyond the scope of this casenote.
50. The reasons advanced for this proposition are:
1) The concept that husband and wife are one;
2) The rule that the husband was liable for his wife's torts, which, if he were to sue,
would place him in the position of suing himself;
3) There was the rule that the wife could sue only by joining her husband as plaintiff,
which also would place him on both sides of the litigation.
H. Clark, Jr., Domestic Relations in the United States § 9.1 at 252 (1968).
51. These public policy arguments are:
1) Such suits would disturb the harmony of the marital relation;
2) They would involve the courts in endless litigation over trivial disputes between the
spouses;
3) They would encourage fraud and collusion between spouses where the conduct
constituting the tort is covered by insurance;
4) The criminal law provides an adequate remedy;
5) Such suits would reward the defendant spouse for his own wrong and since if the
parties are living together, they both share in the benefits of the judgment.
Id. § 9.1 at 253; Note, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 491 at 493.
52. H. Clark, Jr., Domestic Relations in the United States § 9.1 (1968); W. Prosser,
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But it should be noted that the interest of consortium is distinguishable from
the purely emotional or sentimental interests. The latter interests are wholly
personal to the plaintiff, but in the case of loss of consortium, it is the marital
relationship which also suffers, not just the individual participants in that
relationship. In general, the courts have held the marital relationship in high
regard and have not hesitated to protect it. This is evidenced by the fact that
in a majority of jurisdictions intentional interference with the marital relation-
ship is actionable.
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While the marital relationship is not (nor is it suggested that it should
be) considered a separate legal entity, it should be regarded as a distinct
interest worthy of the law's protection in negligence cases as well as in inten-
tional cases. And the individual spouses should both be allowed to assert this
negligent injury as a legitimate cause of action and basis for recovery.
The above two illustrations are excellent examples of the general movement
of legal principles in the area of tort law. This movement, in conjunction with
Judge Keating's reasoning, as expressed in his majority opinion, leads to the
conclusion that this decision is both sound and forward looking.
This decision makes it possible for the wife of a negligently injured man to
sue for loss of consortium in New York. However, the wife's action is limited in
two respects: Where the injured husband has instituted a suit, the wife's cause
of action must be joined with his claim. And if the husband's action has been
terminated through judgment, settlement or otherwise, then the wife is barred
from bringing her consortium action. This procedure will obviate both the
problem of double recovery and the difficulty of retrospective application.
The impact of this decision on other jurisdictions is purely conjectural.
New York has consistently been a leader in law, but it remains to be seen
whether the other jurisdictions, induced by New York's reversal of position,
will take a fresh look at their own positions in this area of the law.
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